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Abstract: 
We explore the pattern of elderly homeownership using microeconomic surveys of 15 OECD 
countries, merging 60 national household surveys on about 300,000 individuals. In all 
countries the survey is repeated over time, permitting construction of an international dataset 
of repeated cross-sectional data. We find that ownership rates decline considerably after age 
60 in all countries. However, a large part of the decline depends on cohort effects. Adjusting 
for them, we find that ownership rates start falling after age 70 and reach a percentage point 
per year decline after age 75. We find that differences across country ownership trajectories 
are correlated with indicators measuring the degree of market regulations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Understanding the determinants of housing trajectories and asset allocation as people get 
older is receiving increasing attention. Often the elderly don’t have enough resources to finance 
post-retirement consumption and medical expenses even though they own substantial assets in 
the form of housing equity. The recent increase in house prices has further tilted the assets of the 
elderly towards housing wealth, and particularly primary residence. From an economy-wide point 
of view, the rapid gains in life expectancy and the rising population share of the elderly will 
undermine the sustainability of national welfare systems unless the elderly will be able to finance 
an increasing portion of their expenditures by accumulated assets. To sustain post-retirement 
consumption people could switch from owning to renting or to owning a smaller unit. 
Alternatively, they can release housing equity by appropriate financial instruments (such as 
reverse mortgages or mortgage equity withdrawal) without selling their property. 
Empirical studies, mostly based on US data, find limited evidence that the elderly 
decumulate housing wealth, see Feinstein and McFadden (1989) and Venti and Wise (2002; 
2004). Rather, the evidence suggests that the elderly prefer to stay in their homes, unless they are 
forced to move by outside shocks - the death of a spouse, health problems, entry into a nursing 
home. The evidence for other countries is far more limited; what evidence there is broadly 
confirms the slow rates of housing decumulation by age observed in the US. One major issue that 
must be addressed in estimating the housing trajectories is that cross-sectional age are 
contaminated by cohort effects and that a significant component of the shape of the cross-
sectional profiles depends on cohort differences. 
The literature is based on country data and, to our knowledge, a systematic international 
comparison of age-trajectories of homeownership is still lacking. In this paper we aim to see 
whether the absence of decumulation is confined to just a few countries, and if there are 
systematic patterns that can be related to international differences in financial markets, 
institutions or public policy. In earlier work, we found that the availability of mortgage finance – 
as measured by loan-to-value ratios – affects the distribution of owner occupancy rates across age 
groups at the young end (Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003), and that in countries with less regulated   2
mortgage markets (i.e. with higher loan-to-value ratios), the homeownership profile is more tilted 
towards the young. Here, we find that also cross-country differences in ownership trajectories 
among the elderly are highly correlated with the degree of mortgage market development and 
other indicators of economy-wide regulation. In particular, we find higher rates of wealth 
decumulation in countries where equity withdrawal is more difficult (such as Italy, France, 
Belgium and Germany) than in countries with more developed mortgage markets (US, UK, 
Denmark and Sweden).    
The empirical analysis uses the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), a collection of 
microeconomic data from several OECD countries. We select 60 national household surveys in 
15 countries to study homeownership trajectories in old age. In each of these countries, we use 
repeated cross-sectional data, allowing us to compare cross-sectional and cohort-adjusted 
profiles. To control for selection issues and for the endogeneity of co-residence arrangements, we 
focus on individuals (not households) aged 50 to 80, a total of more than 300,000 observations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main empirical findings 
of the literature, mainly based on individual country data. Section 3 describes the microeconomic 
data and explains the importance of distinguishing between households and individuals. Section 4 
presents the estimated age profiles. Section 5 relates changes in ownership rates across countries 
to the availability of equity withdrawal regulation and to economy-wide regulation. We find that 
countries with more regulated markets exhibit higher rates of housing decumulation. Section 6 
summarizes our main findings. 
 
 
2. The evidence to date 
 
In developed countries wealth in real estate is the largest component of the assets of the 
elderly. The recent SHARE survey indicates that in Europe residential property accounts for 80 
percent of wealth of households over 65.
1 Primary residence is the largest component, as the 
fraction of homeowners in the eldest age brackets is 70 percent. Since residential wealth is   3
illiquid and non-diversified, it may reduce the ability to smooth consumption through life and 
buffer unforeseen events, such as health shocks. 
In principle, when negative income shocks occur and people need resources to finance 
consumption, homeowners could draw on home equity by financial services that do not require 
selling the house, such as refinancing the mortgage, or home equity lines of credit, such as 
reverse mortgages (Mitchell and Piggott, 2004). In particular, lower mortgage rates stimulate 
refinancing, allowing otherwise liquidity-constrained households to access their home equity and 
finance current consumption (Hurst and Stafford, 2004). Similarly, reverse mortgages would 
allow the elderly to borrow against the value of the house to increase consumption.
2 However, 
such possibilities are available only in countries with well developed financial markets. Davidoff 
(2004) has pointed out that the elderly have a further way to convert home equity to 
consumption: lower home maintenance expenditures compared to other age groups. In such a 
way the elderly effectively can reduce equity without selling the home by letting the property 
deteriorate.
3 
The age profile of homeownership is therefore a useful summary indicator of the asset 
allocation strategies of the elderly and has received considerable attention. It has also been cited 
as indirect evidence in favor or against life-cycle models. Even though the finding of low 
mobility rates among the elderly has been interpreted as a clash with the theory, it is not a 
necessary implication of life cycle models. First of all, housing wealth can be released even 
maintaining the house property. Secondly, observing a portfolio shift from real estate to other 
assets does not necessarily imply that households are running down their wealth. 
Empirically, several papers provide evidence with US data showing that the elderly 
decumulate slowly housing equity, and do so only in limited cases. Feinstein and McFadden 
(1989), using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), find a transition from owning to 
                                                                                                                                                              
1 The Survey of Health, Assets, Retirement and Expectations (SHARE) has information on income, 
consumption, and assets of a sample of the population aged 50+ in 11 European countries. 
2 In this case no repayment is made until the homeowner dies, when the house is sold and the proceeds 
used to repay the loan. 
3 Data reported by Davidoff (2004) from the American Housing Survey data show that homeowners over 
75 spend roughly .8 percent of home value less per year on routine maintenance than younger owners of 
similar homes. 
   4
renting of less than one third of a percentage point per year. In a series of studies, Venti and Wise 
(2002; 2004) use a variety of microeconomic datasets (the Health and Retirement Study, the 
Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old, and the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation) and find no decline in homeownership before age 75; and one averaging 1.76 
percentage points per year thereafter. Substantial rates of decumulation (near 8 percentage points) 
are found only among households that undergo some precipitating shocks. They also find that 
decumulation rates do not vary by family composition or presence of children, which contradicts 
one basic argument of the bequest hypothesis, namely that families with children should 
decumulate wealth more slowly than singles. 
Scattered international evidence confirms the US findings. Crossley and Ostrovsky (2003) 
construct a synthetic panel using 18 cross-sections from three Canadian microeconomic surveys 
and estimate cohort-adjusted profiles of homeownership. They find that the ownership rate 
declines by about 15 percentage points from the peak of 80 percent at age 50-55 to 65 percent at 
age 80. Their conclusion is “mildly supportive of the life-cycle model which suggests that we 
should observe at least some transition from ownership to renting in later life” (p. 15). Ermisch 
and Jenkins (1999), using five waves of the British Household Panel Survey, find that residential 
mobility of the elderly is rare in the UK as well. However, there is some evidence of residential 
downsizing, mainly due to retirement or to the loss of a spouse. 
Although the literature is consistent in finding few evidence of residential mobility among 
the elderly, international comparisons might be able to spotlight the forces that curb it. The first 
paper to take this perspective is Börsch-Supan (1994), who compares housing choices made by 
the elderly in the US and West Germany. Using the PSID and the German Socio-Economic 
Panel, Börsch-Supan finds that ownership rates peak in the 55-59 age-group in both countries, at 
different levels, and decline thereafter at a similar pace. Börsch-Supan suggests that part of the 
difference in the level of homeownership may reflect the homeownership subsidy policy in the 
US and the rent adjustment provision in Germany. 
Tatsiramos (2006) is the only systematic attempt to compare homeownership profiles in 
different EU countries, using data for six countries in the European Community Household Panel 
from 1994 to 2001. He finds residential mobility among the elderly of 1.5 percent per year in 
Southern Europe (Italy and Spain) and 3 percent in Central Europe (France, Germany, the   5
Netherlands) and the UK; in Central Europe downsizing tends to be associated with retirement, in 
Italy and Spain more often with dramatic events such as the death of the spouse. 
In this paper, we consider a long time span of a much larger set of countries to investigate 
whether the absence of housing decumulation may be typical of just a few countries, and whether 
there are patterns relating to international differences in financial market development, national 
institutions or public policy, on top of genuine preferences for owning over renting.  
 
 
3. The international dataset 
 
Wealth data are generally hard to come by or to compare internationally. In this respect, the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is a unique data-set, based on a research project by CEPS-
INSTEAD to enhance international comparability among several household surveys. We take 
fifteen OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United 
States); other potentially interesting countries are excluded for lack of data on home ownership. 
Each of the 60 surveys selected has information on the demographic characteristics of the 
household and home ownership. 
The sample period spans three decades overall. In all countries the cross-section is repeated 
over time, providing an opportunity to exploit time-variability in the owner occupation rates of 
various age groups within and across countries. The earliest surveys are for the United States (the 
1974 March Current Population Survey) and Canada (the 1975 Survey of Consumer Finances), 
the most recent for Belgium (the 2000 Panel Study of Belgian Households), Canada (the 2000 
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics), Finland (the 2000 Income Distribution Survey), 
Germany (the 2000 German Socio Economic Panel Study), Italy (the 2000 Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth), Luxembourg (the 2000 Luxembourg Socio Economic Panel Study), and the 
US (the 2000 March Current Population Survey). In some cases the survey design has changed 
(as in Germany, before and after re-unification). For Belgium, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and the UK we rely on two different surveys. Table 1 provides further details. 
In most of the empirical studies based on microeconomic surveys, the unit of analysis is the   6
household. However, in our framework the standard procedure might induce selection bias, as the 
dissolution of households due, say, to the death of a spouse, might interact with homeownership 
status. Many elderly people deal with this precipitating shock by moving in with their children. 
Standard empirical analysis would refer to the sample of households in the selected group of 
people who remain independent, and are still therefore homeowners. But those who move in with 
their children are effectively “renters” who disappear from the sample of household heads. 
Following this argument, we think it is important to check if there is a discrepancy between 
the two distributions of household heads and individuals by age. Accordingly we define 
ownership on an individual rather than on a household basis, and take a sample of all women 
aged 50 to 80, regardless of whether they are living alone, with their husband, with their children 
or with other persons.
4  
We exclude women older than 80 (regardless of year of birth) for two main reasons. First, 
the choice is motivated by the potential sample bias arising by mortality: it is well known that 
survival probabilities are correlated with wealth and owner occupancy rates, which implies that 
the non-survivors will have lower wealth and ownership rates than the survivors. A second 
source of potential bias is related with the entrance in a nursing home. Elderly selling their house 
and buying long-term care are not represented in national household surveys. This bias might be 
particularly important for the eldest old. For both reasons, our survey data on the very old (80+) 
should not be regarded as representative. 
Table 2 reports the proportion of household heads and women in three age brackets (51-60, 
61-70 and 71-80). By taking women as the unit of analysis we increase the incidence of older 
people in our sample by about 2 percentage points, because – on average – 2 percent of elderly 
women are merged with other households and don’t appear as independent units. Since the size 
of the potential bias is not large, we obtain similar results performing the analysis at the 
individual or household level. We choose to present results for women, and regard the robustness 
of the analysis when homeowners are defined in terms of households as a point in favor of our 
analysis. 
The distribution of women by owner-occupancy rate is reported in Table 3 aggregated in 
                                                 
4 We choose to perform the analysis for women instead of men, because women have longer life 
expectancies, and are more likely to survive men than the other way around.    7
three age bands. In all countries we observe large decline in homeownership by age. There are 
also substantial country differences. While Denmark and Finland display rapid declines in owner 
occupancy rates, in Australia, Ireland and the US about 70 percent of the sample still own their 
house at age 75. It should be noted, however, that Table 3 is based on cross-sectional profiles; as 
we shall see in Section 4, cohort-adjusted profiles deliver a different picture.  
 
 
4. Estimating ownership trajectories 
 
Use of cross-sectional data to estimate ownership profiles can be highly misleading 
(Shorrocks, 1975; Mirer, 1979). The individuals interviewed in any cross-section belong to 
generations that differ in mortality rates, preferences, institutional arrangements, and resources. 
For instance, a finding that ownership declines with age in a cross-section may be due to the fact 
that older generations are less productive, or have different preferences of owning relative to 
renting.
5 In short, in a cross-section one cannot identify both age and cohort effects: in year t, the 
difference in housing wealth between a 50 year old and a 51 year old is equivalent to the wealth 
difference between someone born in year t-50 and someone born in t-51. 
There are two ways to control for the presence of cohort effects: panel data and repeated 
cross-sectional data. Wealth panel data allow the econometrician to track wealth trajectories of 
one particular cohort of retirees. For instance, Diamond and Hausman (1984), find rates of 
dissaving after retirement of about 5 percent per year in the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Mature Men. Hurd (1987), using the Retirement History Survey, finds decumulation rates of 
about 1.5 percent per year, emphasizing that couples with independent children dissave more 
during retirement than childless couples. The second approach, pioneered by Shorrocks (1975) 
and Masson (1986), is to control for differences in productivity and preferences between 
generations using a time-series of cross-sectional data.
6 Repeated cross-sections allow the 
                                                 
5 In the literature, this preference is usually explained by the fact that owning eliminates the principal-
agent relationship, i.e. the owner can make alterations as desired and is not subject to eviction or rent 
increases. 
6 Shorrocks (1975) used 60 years of estate-duty statistics, concluding that wealth is an increasing function 
of age. These statistics over-represent the most affluent households. Masson (1986) constructed cohort-  8
econometrician to track cohorts over time. Although the same individual is only observed once, a 
sample from the same cohort is observed in a later survey. 
Following the repeated cross-sectional approach, we aggregate the data by taking 
averages of the home ownership rates and the control variables for each age/year/country. In our 
15 countries we define 30 age groups (from age 51 to 80) in each of 60 surveys, spanning the 
period 1974-2000. 
Our econometric model posits that in each country the proportion of home owners H of 
age a born in year b is a function of age, a set of demographic variables X (such as working status 
and education) that vary with age or cohort, year of birth b and an error component (ε): 
 
( ) b a b a b a b X a f H , , , ε δ β α + + + + =  (1) 
 
Age, time and cohort effects cannot all be separately identified. Therefore we express 
homeownership as a combination of age and year-of-birth, dropping time dummies and 
interaction terms between age, time and cohort. Since the age effect is likely to be non-linear, we 
choose a third order polynomial in age. Results using a quadratic age polynomial, or a quadratic 
cohort polynomial are similar. 
As a proxy for household resources and preferences, in some specifications we control for 
work status and education. We recode the education variable contained in the original surveys 
into three levels (low, middle and high), based on the 7 categories defined by the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED, 1997). We expect the decline in ownership of 
couples to be lower than that of singles, as couples have greater life expectancy. Previous 
evidence shows that retirement is associated with a transition from owning to renting. Therefore 
we expect those who are working to exhibit higher ownership rates. 
The assumption that age profiles and cohort effects are the same in all countries is 
restrictive. Indeed, an F-test between a restricted specification assuming the same cohort and age 
profiles and an unrestricted regression with full interaction of all variables with country dummies 
overwhelmingly rejects the null hypothesis that the slope coefficients are the same across 
                                                                                                                                                              
adjusted age-wealth profiles using four cross-sections of French data. He found annual rates of   9
countries. We therefore proceed with the analysis estimating separate regressions and ownership 
profiles for each country. 
Regressions are estimated with grouped data, each cell consisting of an age/year of birth 
observation
7. Since the cells represent different numbers of observations, in each country we use 
a weighted least squares method, taking as weights  ()
2
1
, ,
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c b a h h
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w , where n and h are, 
respectively, the number of observations and the probability of ownership in age group a and 
year of birth b. Since the sample in each country is a collection of different surveys, we must 
consider that observations within each survey could be correlated. The correlation might inflate 
the standard errors, an application of neighborhood effects induced by survey designs that are 
based on clusters of observations (Deaton, 1997, p. 73−78). We therefore use a robust variance-
covariance matrix assuming that observations in different samples are independent, but not 
necessarily those within each individual survey.
8 
As mentioned, we estimate cross-sectional and cohort-adjusted ownership trajectories 
separately for each country. Rather then reporting the regression results, we show the results 
graphically in Figure 1, comparing the cross-sectional and cohort-adjusted profiles. In each of the 
country regression, the hypothesis that the age coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected at 
the 1 percent level. As one expects if homeownership increases, on average, over time, in all 
countries the cross-sectional profile lies below the cohort-adjusted profile, showing that 
homeownership is higher for younger cohorts. 
                                                                                                                                                              
decumulation ranging from 0.7 percent for wealthy self-employed persons to 3-4 percent for wage earners. 
7 We also checked if cells could have been defined on the basis of education. The fraction of individuals 
with “college degree” in the elderly population is quite small in several countries, so this procedure ends 
up selecting very small cells in several countries, preventing reliable estimates of the fraction of 
homeowners. For instance in Austria in 1997 the average cell size of women in the age group 75-80 with 
college degree is only 4, and in Luxembourg in 1985 there were no individuals aged 75-80 with college 
degree. 
8 Detailed information on clustering and stratification in individual surveys is not available. We therefore 
proceed under the assumption that in each country the surveys are drawn randomly, and that individual 
errors are uncorrelated between different surveys. This assumption is questionable, because some of the 
underlying surveys in the LIS are panel datasets or contain a panel section (e.g., the Italian SHIW). 
However, since we run individual country regressions, the residual correlation between sampling units 
should not be an excessively great concern.   10
Figure 2 provides further details on the estimated cohort effects plotting, by country, the 
estimated coefficients of year-of-birth in the individual country regressions. Each of the estimated 
coefficients is statistically different from zero at least at the 5 percent level. The figure shows that 
the cohort effect is largest (about one percentage point) in Austria, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
UK. At the other extreme, Australia, Canada and the US exhibit the lowest cohort effects (about 
0.1 points per year of birth).  
To gain further insights into the ownership trajectories, in Figures 3, 4 and 5 we plot the 
change in the cohort-adjusted homeownership rates implied by our regression estimates between 
age 65 and 70, age 70 and 75, and age 75 and 80. Except Belgium in the 65 to 70 change (Figure 
3), all countries exhibit negative changes. However, there is great variability, both across age 
groups as well as between countries. 
In the age-group 65-70 decumulation rates are generally small (less then 2 percentage 
points over a 5-year interval). In the age-groups 70-75 and 75-80 decumulation rates are more 
substantial (3.1 and 4.2 points, respectively). But the most interesting finding is that there is 
considerable dispersion across countries, particularly from age 75 to 80: in Belgium, Finland, 
France and Italy the ownership rate falls by 6 to 8 percentage points, whereas in Denmark, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK the change in the cohort-adjusted profile is less than 2 points. 
Finally, Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the US display intermediate values. 
We check the robustness of the estimated cohort-adjusted profiles adding demographic 
variables to the country regressions. High school or college degree is generally associated with 
higher homeownership probability. Being married and being employed are also generally 
associated with higher ownership rates. Controlling for these additional variables, we find 
decumulation rates of the cohort adjusted profiles very similar to those displayed in Figures 2, 3 
and 4. For brevity these profiles are not reported and are available upon request. 
 
 
5. International differences in ownership trajectories 
 
In this section, using the estimated cohort-adjusted age profiles of ownership, we try to 
explain international differences in ownership trajectories. Among the many possible factors   11
affecting the rate at which ownership changes across countries, we focus on transaction and 
moving costs, the availability of mortgage equity withdrawal, property taxes, generosity of the 
social security systems, unanticipated health expenditure, availability of nursing homes for the 
elderly and differences in mortality rates.   
Previous literature suggests that well-functioning rental markets increase the likelihood that 
the elderly will downsize or sell their house, and that moving costs from owning to renting 
explain in part the low propensity to move by the elderly. Indeed, mobility rates from owning to 
renting tend to be negatively correlated with transaction costs (e.g. the costs of house buying and 
selling), and the degree of the economy’s regulation. 
Different regulations affect also the development of mortgage markets, the availability of 
housing and the age at which individuals buy their homes. This is particularly relevant for young 
households. Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1999; 2006) show that in the absence of a bequest motive, 
a higher down-payment ratio reduces the equilibrium distribution of homeownership rates of 
young generations. Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) provide econometric evidence showing that the 
loan-to-value ratio is an important determinant of the timing of home purchase and of the 
ownership rates of the young. In countries with tighter credit markets (e.g., with lower loan-to-
value ratios) they find lower levels of ownerships among the young than in countries where credit 
is more easily available. 
The degree of financial market development might also explain the availability of financial 
instruments that the elderly can use to reduce their stock of housing wealth. In this context, 
reverse mortgages are potentially important, allowing house-rich but cash-poor old people to 
sustain consumption without leaving their property.
9 Even though at present transaction costs and 
up-front fees tend to reduce take-up rates among the elderly, financial experts expect these 
products to become appealing in the future (Mitchell and Piggott, 2004 and Mitchell, Piggott, 
Sherris and Yow, 2006).
10 There is also some evidence that reverse mortgages tend to reduce 
ownership transitions. In an empirical study using data from the US Home Equity Conversion 
                                                 
9 Reverse mortgage allow homeowners to make use of any equity they have in their property. Under the 
most common type of scheme, the mortgage-backed equity release scheme, a lender gives the homeowner 
either a lump sum or instalments (or both) on the basis of the value of their home. Lenders will receive 
their returns when the loan matures, typically on the death or disablement of the borrower.    12
Mortgage (HECM) program, Davidoff and Welke (2007) find that reverse mortgages have 
enabled people to stay at home longer, although the kind of people who want to get cash out of 
their housing wealth turn relatively soon thereafter to disposal of the entire asset. 
Wherever reverse mortgages are available (Australia, Canada, the US and the UK) as well 
as in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden people can also withdraw housing 
equity increasing their debt by more than investment in the housing stock. In particular, there are 
several methods of withdrawing housing equity without the need to sell the property. The ways 
that are mostly relevant in the present study are over-mortgaging, re-mortgaging, trading down, 
or second mortgage.
11 The hypothesis that we wish to test is if ownership trajectories are flatter in 
countries with relatively more developed access to housing equity withdrawal. 
In many countries the tax code gives preferential treatment to owning as against renting. 
One of the most compelling reasons for these incentives is to shift the allocation of wealth 
towards goods to which society assigns an important weight in creating positive externalities and 
improving living conditions, much as targeting retirement saving is a remedy to household 
myopia and free-riding. In some countries (e.g. the US), property taxes are potentially important 
determinants of the decision to reduce home equity, as they are the main way to finance local 
public services, such as schools or transports. In general, high legal costs and transaction taxes 
might be expected to induce the elderly to prefer downsizing by simultaneously renting a smaller 
unit and letting their house. 
A further factor that needs to be explored is that the generosity of the social security system 
might also be related to the portfolio strategies of the elderly: in countries with more generous 
pensions there is less need to finance post-retirement consumption selling the primary residence. 
On the other hand, the increased generosity of the social security system in several OECD 
countries might be associated to higher rates of homeownership among the elderly. Engelhardt 
(2008) using data from 1978 to 2001 Current Population Surveys finds evidence of a causal 
                                                                                                                                                              
10 In the US, reverse mortgages were authorized in 1987. In Canada borrowers receive a small public 
subsidy. In the UK local governments have been recently involved in granting the loans. 
11 Trading down occurs when a seller moves to a cheaper property, but reduces the mortgage by less; over-
mortgaging if moving to a more expensive home, an owner-occupier increases the mortgage by more than 
the price between the old and the new house. Finally, re-mortgaging or second mortgage happens when a 
homeowner increases an existing mortgage or takes a second mortgage, but does not use the funds to 
improve the property or buy another one.    13
relation between the value of Social Security benefits and the homeownership rate of households 
65 years or older, which has risen steadily in the US in the last twenty years.
12 
Cross-country differences in the decumulation rates among the elderly might be related to 
differences in the choice of entering in a nursing home. In this respect the local availability of 
long-term care services could raise the incentive to sell the house. Since in some countries home 
equity could play the role of a buffer stock against unanticipated risks, such as medical expenses, 
we will also consider the potential role of public health care expenditures. Finally, although the 
differences in mortality rates across the selected OECD countries included in our analysis is 
relatively small, still illness and death occur with different frequency across countries. We 
therefore explore the contribution of life expectancy rates of specific elderly cohorts to 
differences in homeownership.    
To explain international patterns of ownership trajectories, we collected a wide range of 
variables and indicators potentially related to the incentive to reduce home equity. Some of these 
variables are reported in Table 4: an index of mortgage market regulation (taken from Tsatsaronis 
and Zhu, 2004), as a proxy for limited mortgage market development, an index of economy-wide 
regulation (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003) covering many different regulatory areas, property 
taxes as percentages of national GDP (drawn from OECD, 2002) and average number of beds in 
nursing homes per thousand inhabitants (taken from OECD, 2005).  
Figure 6 shows that cohort-adjusted changes in ownership rates between age 75 and 80 
correlates negatively with the selected index of mortgage market regulation. On the basis of such 
evidence, in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and France that feature less 
developed and efficient mortgage markets the elderly are more likely to decumulate housing 
wealth. The UK, Canada, Ireland, Denmark and the US are on the other side of the spectrum, 
with relatively low rates of wealth decumulation and more developed mortgage markets. 
Regulation in financial market is highly correlated with other economy-wide regulations. 
This is confirmed by the strong correlation between our index of mortgage market regulation and 
                                                 
12 Using data from the March 1978 to 2001 Current Population Surveys, Engelhardt (2008) develops an 
instrumental-variable approach that relies on the large variation in Social Security benefits for birth 
cohorts from 1900 to 1930 due to double indexation of the system and the so-called Social Security 
“notch.” Overall, the estimates indicate that between half and as much as all of the time-series rise in   14
the index of economy wide regulation. Moreover, in Figure 7 we find evidence supporting this 
view, as changes in homeownership are also negatively correlated with the index of economy-
wide regulation. 
To summarize the empirical correlations, we then regress the change in homeownership on 
the set of indicators selected. Table 5 reports regressions for cohort-adjusted changes in 
ownership from age 70 to 75, and from age 75 to 80. When we consider the cohort-adjusted 
changes in ownership from age 70 to 75 (the first three regressions) we find that the coefficients 
of the index of mortgage and economy-wide regulation are negative but not statistically different 
from zero at the 10 percent level.  
The evidence is stronger when we consider the change from age 75 to 80: the coefficients 
of the index of mortgage market regulation (in column 4), or alternatively, the index of economy-
wide regulation (in column 5) are negative and statistically different from zero and larger in size 
compared to the previous age group. In order to distinguish between the separate impact of the 
two indicators, we run a regression including both. The coefficients are both negative, but not 
precisely estimated (only the coefficient of economy-wide regulation is statistically different 
from zero at the 10 percent level), due to the high correlation coefficient between the two 
variables (0.82). Similar results are also found when cohort-adjusted changes in ownership are 
obtained from age profiles estimates that control for education and working status. The 
coefficients of both indicators are negative and statistically different from zero, but imprecisely 
estimated when both are used at the same time (as in the last regression of Table 5). 
Both indicators (mortgage market regulation and economic regulation) might be driven by 
an omitted variable, related to historical differences in “liberalism”. As stressed by Glaeser and 
Schleifer (2002), recent research identifies systematic differences between French Civil Law and 
Common Law countries in a variety of social outcomes. Holding the level of economic 
development constant, French Civil Law countries have less secure property rights, greater 
government regulation and intervention, greater government ownership of banks and industry, 
and higher levels of corruption and red tape than do Common Law countries (p. 1220). We 
therefore add a dummy for English origin, taken from La Porta et al (1998). The dummy is not 
                                                                                                                                                              
elderly homeownership over the last twenty-five years can be attributable to the rise in Social Security 
benefits.   15
statistically different from zero.
13 
Finally, in all specifications we find no direct evidence that either “property taxes to GDP 
ratio” or “number of beds in nursing homes per thousand inhabitants” are related to the change in 
ownership rates among the eldest group.
14  
Even though the sample size is admittedly limited, our empirical findings don’t contradict 
the view that market regulation and financial market development – as proxied by the availability 
of mortgage equity withdrawal and mortgage market regulation – affect the distribution of owner 
occupancy rates across age groups among the eldest old.  
Our international-based evidence should be taken only as suggestive of empirical 
correlations that might be present in the data. Ideally, experimental designs are preferable to test 
for the effects of regulations and institutions on exit rates from homeownership. The work of 
Engelhardt and Cunningham (2008) on the effect of the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act in the US 
provides one example in this direction.
15 It is hoped that more of such studies and experimental 
designs will be available also to other OECD countries. 
                                                 
13 To understand if the results are not driven by differences in some form of cultural liberalism we also 
used two further indicators taken from the World Value Survey (2000). “Government responsibility” takes 
value 1 if respondents think that the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is 
provided for, and 10 if they think that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. 
“Competition good or harmful” takes the value 1 if respondents think that competition is good (it 
stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas), and 10 if they think that competition is harmful (it 
brings out the worst in people). Both variables are computed for individuals in the age classes 70 –75 and 
75-80. The coefficients of both regressors were not statistically different from zero. 
14 Other potentially relevant indicators were also considered, such as taxes on imputed rent, as a measure 
of property tax incidence, the social security income replacement rate, as a proxy for the importance of 
social security wealth in total wealth around retirement and price-to income ratio to capture the potential 
role plaid by housing prices. We also took into account the share of population covered by public health 
care and the public health expenditure as percentage of the total health expenditure. In order to control for 
differences in mortality rates we included life expectancy. However, we did not find any significant 
correlation between these variables and change in ownership. 
15 Cunningham and Engelhardt (2008), utilizing data drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and a difference-in-difference approach, suggest that the repeal of the differential capital-gains tax 
embodied in the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act raised the mobility rate by around 1–1.4 percentage points of 
homeowners in their early 50s. 
   16
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The paper estimates age-profiles of homeownership for the elderly using microeconomic 
surveys of 15 OECD countries. For each of them, the surveys are repeated over time. This gives 
an international dataset of repeated cross-sectional data, merging information from 60 national 
household surveys. The analysis is conducted at the level of individuals, not households, and 
therefore is not subject to the critique of the endogeneity of household formation and dissolution. 
We find that ownership rates decline considerably after age 60 in most countries, but that much 
of the decline is due to cohort effects. After adjusting for these effects, we find that ownership 
generally declines after age 70 in virtually all countries, reaching a rate of about 1 percentage 
point per year after age 75. Although the decline is slow, as previous literature has found for 
single countries, and our sample limited, the international comparison suggests that indicators of 
market regulation are correlated with ownership trajectories and therefore with the wealth 
allocation of the elderly.   17
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Figure 1 
The cross-sectional and cohort-adjusted profiles of ownership 
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Note. The country-specific cross-sectional profiles are obtained by the age effect generated by a regression 
of homeownership on a third-order age polynomial. The cohort-adjusted profiles are obtained by the age 
effect generated by a regression of homeownership on a third-order age polynomial and “year-of-birth”. In 
each country, data refer to women aged 50 to 80. 
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Figure 2 
The estimated cohort effects in ownership 
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Note. The country-specific cohort effects are the coefficients of year-of-birth in a regression of 
homeownership that includes also a third-order age polynomial. In each country, data refer to women aged 
50 to 80.  
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Figure 3 
Change in ownership: age 65 to 70 
-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
Change in cohort adjusted profile
US
UK
Sweden
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
Ireland
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
 
Note. The difference in ownership rate from age 65 to 70 is calculated from the country-specific cohort-
adjusted profiles displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 4 
Change in ownership: from age 70 to 75 
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Note. The difference in ownership rate from age 70 to 75 is calculated from the country-specific cohort-
adjusted profiles displayed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 5 
Change in ownership: from age 75 to 80 
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Note. The difference in ownership rate from age 75 to 80 is calculated from the country-specific cohort-
adjusted profiles displayed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 6 
Change in ownership from age 75 to 80 and mortgage market regulation 
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Note. The change in ownership is the cohort-adjusted change in ownership between age 75 and 80.  
 
Figure 7 
Change in ownership from age 75 to 80 and economy-wide regulation 
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Note. The change in ownership is the cohort-adjusted change in ownership between age 75 and 80.  
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Table 1 
The international dataset 
 
Country  Surveys and years available  Number of 
individuals per 
survey 
Average cell 
size 
 
Australia  Australian Income and Housing Costs Survey: 1981, 1989, 
1994 
14,916 262 
Austria Austrian  Micro-census: 1987, 1995 
European Community Household Panel: 1997 
16,524 178 
Belgium  Survey of the Centre for Social Policy: 1985, 1988, 1992, 
1997; Panel Study of Belgium Households: 2000 
8,567 55 
Canada  SCF: 1975, 1981, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1997; Survey of 
Labour and Income Dynamics: 2000 
61,718 290 
Denmark 
 
Income Tax Survey: 1987, 1992  7,530  121 
Finland  Income Distribution Survey: 1987, 1991, 1995, 2000 
 
15,716 212 
France  Household Budget Survey: 1984, 1989, 1994 
 
11,974 129 
Germany  German Socio Economic Panel Study: 1984, 1989, 1994, 
2000 
9,724 78 
Ireland 
 
ESRI: 1987; European Community Household Panel: 1996, 
2000 
3,864 31 
Italy  Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth: 
1986, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 
23,429 126 
Luxembourg  Luxembourg Social Economic Panel Study: 1985, 1997, 
2000 
2,889 24 
Netherlands  Enquiry on the Use of Public Services: 1983, 1987. Socio-
Economic Panel: 1991, 1994, 1999 
7,427 48 
Sweden  Income Distribution Survey: 1992, 1995 
 
14,650 236 
United Kingdom  Family Expenditure Survey: 1991, 1995 
Family Resource Survey: 1999 
17,298 139 
United States  March Current Population Survey: 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 
1994, 1997, 2000 
71,899 331 
 
All countries 
 
60 surveys 
 
300,967 
 
157 
 
Note. The number of observations refers to the country average number of women aged 50 to 80. 
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Table 2 
Sample composition by age groups 
 
Country Age  51-60 
 
Age 61-70  Age 71-80 
 Households  Individuals  Households  Individuals Households Individuals 
          
Australia   41.45  39.13  33.91 33.84  24.65 27.04 
Austria   42.27  38.74  34.45 34.41  23.28 26.85 
Belgium 45.54  44.87  34.76 34.49 19.70 20.64 
Canada 43.59  41.95  30.20 29.67 26.21 28.38 
Denmark   41.62  40.07  33.76 33.16 24.62 26.77 
Finland 52.84  50.99  32.23 31.90 14.93 17.11 
France 45.32  43.48  34.00 34.14 20.68 22.38 
Germany 48.55  45.54  33.26 33.74 18.20 20.72 
Ireland   45.59  44.72  32.87 32.09 21.53 23.19 
Italy 46.52  44.89  33.80 33.85 19.67 21.26 
Luxembourg 47.63  45.66  31.56 30.91 20.81 23.43 
Netherlands 44.44  42.56  34.59 35.22 20.97 22.22 
Sweden 47.29  45.94  28.61 27.96 24.10 26.10 
United Kingdom  41.81  40.47  33.92 33.56 24.27 25.97 
United  States 46.52  44.90  31.37 31.33 22.12 23.77 
 
Note. The table reports the percentage of household heads and women by each age group. Statistics are 
computed using sample weights. Country values are aggregated over different years. 
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Table 3 
Ownership by age group  
 
Country 
 
Age 51-60  Age 61-70  Age 71-80 
Australia   82.16  81.02  71.76 
Austria   67.04  60.69  47.16 
Belgium 77.60  74.89  65.33 
Canada 78.62  73.73  58.98 
Denmark 65.40  54.02  43.65 
Finland 83.54  75.10  61.62 
France 69.27  67.56  55.11 
Germany 49.62  50.62  41.44 
Ireland 89.93  87.82  78.24 
Italy 69.74  64.36  50.02 
Luxemburg 79.23  71.89  57.90 
Netherlands 44.92  33.41  22.67 
Sweden 75.39  69.12  53.32 
United Kingdom  75.93  67.08  55.58 
United States  76.52  76.92  72.03 
 
Note. The table reports the percentage of women owning a home by age group. Country values are 
averaged over different years.  
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Table 4 
Index of mortgage market and economy-wide regulation, property taxes, and number 
of beds in nursing homes: international comparisons 
 
  Index of mortgage 
market regulation 
Index of economy 
wide regulation 
Property tax to GDP 
ratio 
Number of beds in 
nursing homes 
        
Australia 0.1  0.24  0.027  4.8 
Austria 0.9  0.49  0.006  1.7 
Belgium 0.9  0.80  0.013  2.9 
Canada 0.5  0.54  0.037  12.2 
Denmark 0.3  0.50  0.017  5.1 
Finland 0.5  0.67  0.011  4.3 
France 0.7  0.88  0.024  1.3 
Germany 0.7  0.52  0.010  8.6 
Ireland 0.1  0.20  0.016  6.9 
Italy 0.9  1.00  0.023  2.7 
Luxembourg 0.3  n.a  0.036  5.9 
Netherlands 0.5 0.49 0.019  3.8 
Sweden 0.3  0.49  0.020  5.4 
UK 0.1  0.00  0.038  3.1 
US 0.3  0.28  0.032  5.4 
 
Note. The index of mortgage market regulation is taken from Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004). The score adds 
one point for fulfilling each of the following five criteria: (1) Mortgage rate arrangement are primarily 
extended on the basis of fixed rate contracts; (2) Mortgage equity withdrawals is absent or limited; (3) The 
loan-to-value ratio does not exceed 75 percent; (4) Valuation methods of property is based on historical 
values, rather than based on market values; (5) Mortgage backed securitization is absent or limited. The 
index is then normalized to one. The index of economy wide regulation is taken from Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003). The index is a wide indicator of the degree of economic regulation covering many 
different regulatory areas (state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, administrative regulations, tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, etc.) aggregated through factor analysis. The property tax to GDP ratio is drawn from 
OECD (2002). Number of beds in nursing homes per thousand inhabitants refers to 2003 or closest year 
available and is taken from OECD Health Data (2005) CD -Rom. 
  
Table 5 
Regressions for change in ownership 
 
 
  From 70 to 75 
 
From 75 to 80  From 75 to 80, with demographics 
Index of mortgage market regulation  -0.003    0.007  -0.078    -0.008  -0.070    -0.013 
 (0.019)    (0.018)  (0.034)**   (0.033)  (0.010)***  (0.039) 
Index of economy-wide regulation    -0.029  -0.035  -0.086  -0.079  -0.082  -0.071   
   (0.017)  (0.022)    (0.027)**  (0.041)*   (0.034)**  (0.047)* 
Property tax to GDP ratio  0.436  0.185  0.210  0.394  0.776  0.680  -0.043  0.491  0.396 
  (0.448) (0.459) (0.447) (0.918) (0.725) (0.849) (0.272) (0.919) (0.978) 
Number of beds in nursing homes  0.038  -0.157  -0.147  -0.002  0.017  0.012  0.118  0.055  0.048 
  (0.202) (0.116) (0.109) (0.296) (0.184) (0.208) (0.088) (0.233) (0.239) 
English legal origin  -0.001  -0.009  -0.008  -0.016 -0.025 -0.024 -0.008 -0.024 -0.024 
  (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.007) (0.026) (0.027) 
Constant -0.038  -0.010  -0.012  -0.006  -0.009 -0.007 -0.013 -0.004 -0.001 
  (0.023) (0.012) (0.012) (0.033) (0.019) (0.023) (0.010) (0.024) (0.026) 
           
Observations  15 14 14 15 14 14 15 14 14 
R-squared  0.19 0.37 0.45 0.43 0.63 0.60 0.88 0.46 0.48 
 
 
Note. The table reports robust regressions for cohort-adjusted changes in ownership from age 70 to 75, and from age 75 to 80. The last three 
columns estimate cohort-adjusted changes in ownership when age profiles estimates control also for education and working status. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10 percent level; two stars at the 5% level; three stars at the at the 1% 
level. 
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